Chapter 9: Evidence of Identity
PDF version of Chapter 9
(1) THE PROBLEM OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY AND THE TURNBULL GUIDELINES
(A) R v Turnbull
The problem of mistaken identity has been a recurrent problem in the dispensation of criminal justice since the trial of Adolph Beck. Beck was convicted twice in 1896 and 1904 on the evidence of mistaken identity and doubly pardoned. The mistaken identification of Beck led to the setting up of a Committee of Inquiry, the report of which in 1905 led to the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Two other cases of mistaken identity which led to the prosecution and exoneration of Luke Clement Dougherty and Lazlo Virag led to the setting up of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases on 1 May 1974 under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin. In a Report published on 26 April 1976, the Committee made several recommendations on the various means of identification. The recommendations were followed by the Court of Appeal in R v Turnbull where the following guidelines were enunciated.
There is a special need for caution when the prosecution case depends on evidence of visual identification.
The summing-up should contain a warning of the need for caution and an explanation as to why caution is needed.
The summing-up should deal with the circumstances of the identification in the particular case.
The judge should point out that a convincing witness may be mistaken.
Although judges are required to adhere strictly to these guidelines , in some cases it may not be appropriate to apply Turnbull . In Reid v R the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated that failure by the trial judge to give the general warning as to the dangers of not giving such a warning as prescribed in Turnbull would cause a conviction to be quashed. However, in R v Hewett and R v Oakwell the Court of Appeal held in both cases that identity problems confronting the Court were not within the scope of the Turnbull guidelines. In the former, the offence had been committed by the driver of a car. Police officers gave evidence that they had followed a man driving this car the defendant alleged the woman was driving. Since the issue was whether the man or the woman was driving, the Court concluded that Turnbull was not appropriate. In the latter, a police constable had been assaulted and knocked to the ground. It was alleged that while he was on the ground he might have been confused and thought that, because the defendant was standing beside him when he got up, the defendant must have been his assailant. It was held that this was not within the Turnbull guidelines.
(B) Withdrawing the case from the jury
The principle enunciated by Lord Widgery in R v Turnbull is as follows:
“When in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identify is poor, as for example when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions, the situation is very different. The judge should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. This may be corroborated in the sense lawyers use the word; but it need not be so if its effect is to make the jury sure that there is no mistaken identity.”
This principle is neatly illustrated by R v Smith and Doe where the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have withdrawn the case where one of the identifying witnesses (who was elderly) was confused and unclear and Garner v Chief Constable of Manchester where the Divisional Court quashed a conviction which had depended on the identification of the defendant by a police officer who had only seen the assailant for a split second. Although an appellant court will not overrule the judge's decision to allow the case to go to the jury even if it is borderline and the judge has seen the witness , if at the end of the case the prosecution have not made the identification clear enough he should withdraw the case from the jury at the end of the prosecution case.
(2) MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE ACCUSED
There are various means of identifying the accused, viz. visual identification; identification in court; identification out of court; video identification; the use of photographs; the use of photofits and sketches; and other forms of identification.
(B) Visual identification (or recognition?)
According to Professor W. Twining, the statement ‘X identified Y' is a paradigm of ambiguity. It could mean: X recognised Y or ‘X formed the belief that Y was the same as Z' or ‘X decided that Y was the same as Z' because in looking at the problem of identification it is obvious that “a complex variety of mental processes and human actions are involved: seeing, hearing, acquiring, storing, interpreting, and receiving information, asserting, communicating, describing, persuading, deciding, and so on”.
The adjudicative problem raised by treating “evidence of recognition” as one of “visual identification” was highlighted by three cases. In R v Ryan D was charged with the robbery of a chemist's shop. The only prosecution evidence was that of a 17-year-old schoolgirl who said that she recognised D as being the brother of a girl who was at her school and described D's hairstyle, the jumper he was wearing and that he had a bag round his neck. When police visited D his hairstyle differed from that described; he was not wearing the jumper nor did he have a bag around his neck. There was no identification parade and the judge declined to accede to a submission of no case made by the defence. D was convicted and appealed. It was held, dismissing the appeal, that the matters concerning the hairstyle and the absence of identification parade could be explained and the summing-up was impeccable. This case must be contrasted with R v Bentley where on a charge of “glassing” V with whom D was not on friendly terms, the only evidence that D was responsible came from V who had had about seven or eight pints of lager which had affected him significantly that the casualty officer noticed that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of admission into the hospital. V did not identify D but said that as he (V) turned from the bar he had seen D's arm clad in red. Although D did not have a red jacket, he was convicted. D's appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed on the ground that the judge did give a sufficient Turnbull direction. In a commentary on this case, Professor Birch said:
“The possibility to which the jury required to be directed in the present case was that [V] in his inebriated condition, might have interpreted the blue which he registered just before he was struck as [D's] arm, but this interpretation could have been based, not on observation, but on deduction from the history of the ill-feeling between the two, coupled with the altercation they had just had. By the time the case came for trial, this interpretation of events could have been ingrained in [V's] memory as though it had been observed by him, and in his testimony he could quite honestly have sworn that it was, because by that time, he had come to believe wholeheartedly in his own interpretation. The certainty with which honest witnesses testify incorrectly to visual identification or recognition is something outside the ken of the ordinary juror, and it is right and proper that no miscarriage of justice occurs simply because of the jury's ignorance of this “ghastly risk”, as it has been called.”
Again, in R v Taylor (Michelle Ann) , Michelle and Lisa Taylor, two sisters, were convicted of murder. The ground of the appeal was based on materials which came to light since the trial that the conviction was based on evidence of mistaken identity. The witness first stated that one of the girls leaving the scene of the crime may have been black but later said both girls were blonde. The defendants appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal. To avoid miscarriages of justice, where the prosecution case depends wholly or partly on evidence of visual identification or recognition, the judge should direct the jury along the established Turnbull guidelines. Evidence of visual identification must be supported by strong evidence which need not be corroborative evidence stricto sensu but must be such as to make the jury sure that there has not been a mistaken identification.
(C) Identification in court
The general principle is that unless there are exceptional circumstances a witness should not be allowed to identify a witness for the first time in the dock. The rationale is that the witness may be influenced in making an identification by sight of the defendant. Identification in court is allowed in the following cases: (i) where the defendant refused to participate in an identification parade ; (ii) where the police officer or investigating officer is prevented through illness from making an identification before the trial ; and where the witness had to pick out one person from two or more witnesses known to him. In all these cases, a dock identification is proper.
(D) Identification out of court
A witness may identify the defendant out of court in three ways: (i) at a confrontation; (ii) at a group identification; and (iii) at an identification parade.
(ii) Identification at a confrontation
An identification at a confrontation refers to a situation where a witness confronts the defendant alone, usually but not necessarily at a police station. Accidental confrontations such as the one in R v Campbell where a witness (B) recognised D at a confrontation at the magistrates' court will not be excluded provided an inferior form of identification is not used to wreck the prospect of a better one. Annex C to Code D of the Codes of Practice promulgated pursuant to section 66 of PACE states that a confrontation, if used at all, must be confined to rare and exceptional circumstances. For example, in R v Ladlow, Moss, Green and Jackson the defendants were amongst a group of 20 or so suspects arrested after a disorder in a pub. Because of the difficulties caused by the number of suspects it was decided to use the direct confrontation method of identification. The prosecution saw that it would have been necessary to hold 221 separate parades and moreover it was difficult to find any volunteers. In spite of these problems the trial judge accepted the defence submission that evidence derived from confrontation should be excluded.
It must also be noted that a confrontation must be in the presence of the suspect's solicitor and that the police cannot use reasonable force to make a suspect submit to a confrontation by a witness.
(iii) Group identification
Pursuant to Code D of the Codes of Practice, a group identification (i.e. one in which the identification officer – “I.O.” – not below the rank of an inspector must arrange that the subject is in a group of people) must be held where it is not possible to hold a parade or where it is not practicable or because of fear on the part of a witness or for some other reasons the IO thinks that it is more satisfactory than a parade (Code D 2.7).
(iv) Identification Parade
Annex A to Code D of the Codes of Practice sets out the detailed procedure for an identification parade. If the suspect wants one because of his unusual appearance, one must be held. The two features of the procedure are one-way screens and identification by numbers rather than pointing or touching.
(v) Is it mandatory to hold an identification parade if the defendant demands it?
Prior to 1997, the law seemed reasonably clear. In R v Gaynor the police had trouble in finding enough like individuals to form an identification parade and decided to have a group identification. The trial judge excluded the evidence on the ground that a parade could and should have been held. Again, in R v Conway (John) where the police officer giving evidence said: “An identification parade does not take place if we have a named person” – by which he meant where the victim thought he knew the suspect – the evidence of identification was excluded. Where the suspect agrees to take part in a parade but there were insufficient numbers of like individuals, evidence of group identification or confrontation will be excluded if the police do not take all reasonable steps to hold a parade.
The problem in the last few years has been the interpretation of Code D, paras. 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.10 and 2.17 of the Codes of Practice. Code D 2.3 states:
“2.3. Where a suspect disputes an identification, an identification parade shall be held if the suspect consents unless paragraphs 2.4 or 2.7 or 2.10 apply. A parade may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation considers that it would be useful, and the suspect consents.”
Code D 2.4 states:
“2.4 A parade need not be held if the identification officer considers that, whether by reason of unusual appearance of the suspect or for some other reason, it would not be practicable to assemble sufficient people who resembled him to make the parade fair.”
Code D 2.7 has been discussed above and need not detain us here. Code D 2.10 states:
“2.10 The identification officer may show a witness a video film of a suspect if the investigating officer considers, whether because of the refusal of the suspect to take part in an identification parade or group identification or other reasons, that this would in the circumstances be the most satisfactory cause of action.”
Finally, Code D 2.17 states:
“2.17 A police officer may take a witness to a particular neighbourhood or place to see whether he can identify the person whom he said he saw on the relevant occasion. Before doing so, where practicable a record shall be made of any description given by the witness of the suspect. Care should be taken not to direct the witness's attention to any individual.”
In R v Quinn the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction because of breaches of Code D and the failure of the trial judge to make specific reference to the breaches in his summing-up to the jury. Lord Taylor CJ said:
“We wish to emphasise that where a detailed regime is laid down in a statutory Code, it is not for police either at any one or more police stations to substitute their own procedure and their own rules for that which is laid down. We hope that either they will come into line immediately, or if it is thought necessary to change the rules that will be done in the appropriate manner. But as long as there is a statutory Code, it is there to be observed not to be varied at will .”
Code 2.3 is “there to be observed”. It states that an identification parade “shall be held”, that is, it is mandatory. Code 2.4 states that “[a] parade need not be held if … it would not be practicable …” The decisions of the Court of Appeal in Quinn and the line of cases discussed above and R v Macmath are authorities for the proposition that an identification parade is mandatory where the suspect requires it unless it is not reasonably practicable to hold a parade and that failure to accede to his request triggers the judge's discretion under section 78 of PACE to exclude other evidence of identification because it is adverse to the fairness of the proceedings.
In R v Malashev and the cases sequel to it , the Court of Appeal also developed a counterprinciple that there is no requirement under Code D 2.3 of the Code of Practice that an already identified suspect should be put on an identification parade simply because he disputes the identification. This counterprinciple was soundly rejected by the House of Lords in R v Forbes . In that case D was charged with attempted robbery. D denied the accusation and asked repeatedly for an identification parade to be held. At the trial the Recorder, following Popat , held that since there had been a full and complete identification of the defendant, an identification parade was unnecessary. She accordingly accepted the complainant's identification evidence without considering section 78 of PACE and gave no direction to the jury of any breach of Code D 2.3. On appeal to the House of Lords it was also argued that an accused right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention had been infringed. Lord Bingham, delivering the judgement of the House, held:
Code D 2.3 imposed a mandatory obligation on police officers, subject to certain exceptions specified in D 2.4, D 2.7 or D 2.10, to hold an identification parade whenever the suspect disputed the identification and consented to it.
There had been a breach of Code D 2.3.
The situations not covered by Code D 2.3 are as follows:
(i) where an eye-witness makes it plain to the police he cannot identify the culprit, it is futile to invite that witness to attend an identification parade;
(ii) where an eye-witness may be able to identify clothing worn by the culprit, but not the culprit himself, it is futile to mount a parade rather than inviting the witness to identify the clothing; and
(iii) if the case is one of pure recognition of someone well-known to the eye-witness, it is futile to hold an identification parade.
The fair trial right under Article 6 of the Convention must be assessed on all the facts and the whole history of the proceedings. True, the Recorder did not exercise her discretion to exclude the evidence under section 78 of PACE. The evidence was compelling and untainted and had been rightly admitted.
The Code on identification parade has been revised twice after Forbes : first by Code D 2.15 then Code D 3.12 which states:
“Whenever a suspect disputes being the person the witness claims to have seen, an identification procedure (not, as before, identification parade) shall be held unless it is not practicable or it would secure no useful purpose .”
In R v Harris the victims of robbery claimed to have recognised one of their assailants. No identification parade was held. The trial judge ruled that it was a case of recognition and fell within Code D 2.15 where a parade “would serve no useful purpose” in proving or disproving whether the suspect was involved. The defendant was convicted and appealed. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was a case of “recognition” rather than identification and did not fall within the specific example given in para 2.15 where the suspect is already known to the witness because the suspect did not accept that he knew, or was known to, the victims.
(E) Video film identification
Annex B to Code D of the Codes of Practice sets out the detailed procedure for a video film identification. The video identification must be arranged if this is the only satisfactory course of action because the suspect has refused to attend a parade or a group identification. In such a case, it is the responsibility of the identification officer or officers to arrange, supervise and direct the making of the film. The film must include the suspect and at least eight other people who resemble the suspect in age, height, appearance and position in life. The suspect and his solicitor, friend or appropriate adult must be allowed to see the film before it is shown to witnesses.
In R v Jones, Dowling, Jones and Brown a doorman was allowed to pick suspects from a video film. The video was then shown to the victim of an assault who picked the same suspects. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that this method infringed Code D of the Codes of Practice.
It must be noted, however, that whilst it is inappropriate to give the full Turnbull directions – the jury should be warned of the risk of mistaken identification and the need to exercise particular care in any identification which they made for themselves.
(F) The use of photographs
The general principles in the use of photographs is that the police may show a witness a photograph in order to identify the suspect but once he is arrested and there is an opportunity to identify him in person, photographs should not be shown to witnesses before an identification parade. In R v Wright the Court of Appeal held that an irregularity had occurred where a witness had volunteered in examination-in-chief that he had seen a photograph of the defendant in the “rogues gallery” at New Scotland Yard. Again, in R v Lamb S and G were shown separately D's photograph from three albums containing 700 photographs. D demanded a confrontation and was physically identified. At the trial, the prosecution decided to produce the album of photographs to the jury to show them the photograph which had been picked by S and G. The page of the album containing the photograph was held up to the jury. The Court of Appeal held that the production of the photographs as part of the prosecution case was an irregularity which should not have occurred. Annex D to Code D of the Codes of Conduct sets out the detailed procedure for the showing of photographs.
(G) Photofits and sketches
Although it has been argued that the reception of photofits is obnoxious to the rule against consistent statements , the Court of Appeal in R v Cook held that they were admissible since they were in a class of their own. The Court added that it was necessary to give a Turnbull warning.
The question of admissibility of a sketch was considered in R v Smith (Percy) . In that case a witness had seen a man near the house where a woman was murdered and made a sketch of the suspect. It was held that the sketch was admissible.
(H) Other forms of identification
(i) Fingerprints, footmarks or similar body impressions and DNA evidence
Identification is often made by fingerprints. In Callis v Gunn it was held that fingerprint evidence was admissible although the accused had not been cautioned when asked by the police officer for his prints. Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003) replaces sections 61 and 64 of PACE by allowing fingerprints of persons arrested for recordable offence and who are held in a police station to be taken without their consent.
Section 62 of PACE deals with intimate samples which include blood, semen, urine or pubic hair from a suspect. The power to take intimate samples with consent is now governed by section 62 (1A) of PACE inserted by section 52 (3) of the CJPOA 1994.
Non-intimate samples include sample of hairs other than pubic hair, footprints and saliva. The power to take non-intimate samples without consent is now governed by section 10 of the CJA 2003.
DNA evidence involves comparing the genetic material extracted from the crime stain with a sample taken from the suspect. If the sample does not match there is lack of identity; but if it does match an expert will, on the basis of empirical statistical data, give the frequency with which the matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large. This is called “the random occurrence ratio”. For example, in R v Cooke C was charged with rape. DNA profile of a hair sample provided by C was identical to the semen profile taken from an item of clothing at the scene of the crime. Expert evidence was adduced to show that the chance of the semen coming from another person was 1 : 73 million. C was convicted. This case must be contrasted with R v Adams where the appellant was charged with rape. His appeal was allowed because the judge failed to sum up properly the expert's exposition of the Bayes Theorem, a statistical method of analysis.
Recent amendments made to the law relating to the taking of fingerprints and samples are as follows:
Section 78 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA 2001) allows the police to retake fingerprints (including palmprints ) and samples where an individual has been convicted of a recordable offence and the initial set of fingerprints and samples was incomplete or of poor quality.
Section 81 of the CJPA 2001 allows the police to check fingerprints and DNA samples and the profiles against records held by foreign police forces, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Police.
Section 82 (2) of the CJPA 2001 abrogates the obligation in section 64 of PACE to destroy fingerprints and samples taken from an individual if that person was later acquitted and replaces it with the rule of law that fingerprints and samples retained in such circumstances can be used for “purposes related to the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence and the conduct of any prosecution”. The fons et origo of this rule is A-G's Ref. (No. 3 of 1999) . In that case the Court of Appeal held that there was no discretion on the part of the judge to allow the evidence. The House of Lords reversed the decision adding that the possibility that such evidence might be allowed did not violate Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (right to privacy) of the Convention. Again, in R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire S, aged 11, was arrested and charged with attempted robbery. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken, he was tried and acquitted. Mr Marper (M) was arrested and charged with harassment of his partner. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. M and his partner had become reconciled and the charge was not pressed. S and M asked for their fingerprints and samples to be destroyed and in both cases the police refused. S and M's application for judicial review of the police decision not to destroy their fingerprints and samples was rejected by the Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal. On appeal to the House of Lords, the Law Lords, dismissing S and M's appeal, were inclined to the view that the mere retention of fingerprints and DNA samples did not constitute an interference with private life (Article 8 (1) of the Convention) but stated that, if it did, it was within the margin of appreciation provided by Article 8 (2) of the Convention since the retention of fingerprints and samples were provided for by law, that is, s.82 of the CJPA 2001.
In S and Marper v United Kingdom , S and M applied to the European Court of Human Rights complaining that the retention of their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles after the criminal proceedings against them had ended with an acquittal or had been discontinued violated Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The European Court held that the retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA of persons suspected but not convicted or charged with offences was a violation of Article 8 (the right to privacy) and that it was not necessary to examine separately Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). The Court stated that the retention constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants' right to privacy and could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. In arriving at this decision, the Court observed that “the United Kingdom is the only member State [in the European Union] expressly to permit the systematic and indefinite retention of DNA profiles and cellular samples of persons who have been acquitted or in respect of whom proceedings have been discontinued” and noted the current position in Scotland, part of the United Kingdom, where the Scottish Parliament voted to retain DNA samples etc. only in case of adults charged with violent or sexual offences and for three years only with a possibility of extension for a further two years with the consent of a sheriff. The Court also took into consideration the fact that the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles stored on the Police National Computer for “purposes related to the prevention and detection of crime”, “the investigation of an offence” or “the conduct of a prosecution” were not only accessible to the police but also to “56 non-police bodies, including Government agencies and departments, private groups such as British Telecom and Association of British Insurers, and even certain employers”.
(ii) Possession of incriminating articles
Possession of incriminating articles may provide evidence of identity. In Thompson v R D was charged with gross indecency with two boys. The boys said that after committing the offences the defendant made an appointment to meet them at a public lavatory three days later. The police were informed. When the defendant kept the appointment one of the boys pointed him out. Powder puffs and indecent photographs were found in the defendant's possession. These articles had not been used in the offences. The House of Lords, however, held that the evidence of the accused's possession of such articles had been rightly admitted since it supported the identification of the accused. The flaw in this line of reasoning was expressed five years later when Sherman J in R v Manning held that in a breaking and entering charge skeleton keys found in the house of the accused were inadmissible if entry was effected by a jemmy. In other words, the incriminating articles found in possession or custody of the accused must directly link him to the alleged crime.
(iii) Similar facts
Similar fact evidence may be adduced to establish identity. A neat illustration of this proposition is R v Straffen . In that case, Straffen was charged with murder by manual strangulation of two little girls at Bath on July 15 and August 8, 1951 respectively. He was found unfit to plead and was committed to Broadmoor Institution. On April 29, 1952 he escaped from Broadmoor and was at large from 2.40 p.m. until 6.40 p.m. and was rearrested and returned to Broadmoor. At about 6.00 a.m. the following morning the body of Linda Bowyer was found in the village of Little Farley , Berkshire , and her bicycle was found some two hundred yards away. She had died from manual strangulation. Evidence was tendered by the prosecution to prove the similarities between the circumstances of the three cases and the method employed by Straffen in each. Cassels J admitted the evidence tendered on the ground that it was material to establish the identity of the murderer in the case before him. Where the only similar fact evidence adduced such as a voice identification is not strongly probative judges should exercise their discretion under section 78 of PACE and exclude the evidence because admitting it would be adverse to the fairness of the proceedings.
(iv) Voice identification
Although there is no Code of Practice stating the procedure to be adopted in voice identification, evidence of such identification based on the comparison of the suspect's voice with a recording of the perpetrator's voice may be admitted whether it is tendered in court by a non-expert or by an expert.
(v) Tracker dogs
In R v Pieterson Lord Taylor CJ held that the evidence of a dog's reaction to the existence of the scent of a particular individual could be admitted if the following safeguards were adhered to:
“First, the proper foundation must be laid by detailed evidence establishing the reliability of the dog in question. Secondly, the judge, must in giving his directions to the jury, alert them to the care that they need to take and to look with circumspection at the evidence of tracker dogs, having regard to the fact that dog may not always be reliable and cannot be cross-examined.”
In a South African case , it was regarded as unreliable. However, such evidence has been received in Scotland , Northern Ireland and New Zealand .
For an outline of Beck's case, see W.M. Best, The Principles of the Law of Evidence , ed. by S.L. Phipson (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1922), 448-450 and N. Sweeney, “Adolf Beck: The Ghost of Justice” (2006) 170 JPN 150-152.s
Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee and Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, HC 338, London , 1976.
 3 All ER 549,  QB 224.
R v Bentley  Crim LR 620.
McShane v Northumbria Chief Constable (1980) 72 Cr App R 209 at 211, per Lord Widgery.
 Crim LR 113.
 RTR 174.
(1977) 66 Cr App R 174
 QB 224 at 229.
(1987) 85 Cr App R 197.
(1983) The Times, 14 May.
R v Hayes  1 WLR 234.
Daley v R  1 AC 117, PC.
W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1994), at 169.
 Crim LR 50.
 Crim LR 620.
D. Birch  Crim LR 622.
(1994) 98 Cr App R 361.
Shand v R  1 All ER 511, PC.
R v Long (1973) 57 Cr App R 871.
R v Cartwright (1914) 10 Cr App R 219, R v Hunter ( Crim LR 262 and R v Howick  Crim LR 403.
R v John  Crim LR 113.
R v Caird  Crim LR 656.
R v Hughes (1977) The Times, 8 November.
 Crim LR 500.
Williams v R  1 WLR 548, PC.
 Crim LR 219.
R v Jones, R v Nelson (1999) The Times, 21 April, CA.
See R v Gaynor  Crim LR 242.
 Crim LR 402.
See R v Britton and Richards  Crim LR 144. Cf. R v Thorne  Crim LR 702.
 1 Cr App R 480.
Ibid., p.488 (emphasis added).
 Crim LR 58.
 Crim LR 587.
See D v DPP (1998) The Times, 7 August; R v Anastasiou (1998) Crim LR 67; R v El-Hannachi  2 Cr App R 226; R v Popat  2 Cr App R 208; R v Nicholson (1999) The Times, 7 September; and R v Popat (No. 2)  1 Cr App R 387.
 1 Cr App R 430, HL.
Ibid., para. 27. See R v Miah  10 Arch. News 2.
2003 Revision; emphasis added.
 ECWA Crim 174 (4 February 2003).
(1994) 158 JPR 293.
R v Blenkinsop  1 Cr App R 7, CA.
R v Chadwick (1917) 12 Cr App R 247.
(1934) 25 Cr App R 198.
(1980) 71 Cr App R 198. Cf. R v Allen  Crim LR 426.
R v Okorodu (1982] Crim LR 747 and R v O'Brien  Crim LR 746.
(1987) 84 Cr App R 369.
 Crim LR 511.
 1 QB 405.
See R v Dallagher (2002) The Times, 21 August. In that case, the accused was charged with murder. Expert evidence which showed that the ear print found on a window at the scene of the crime was the accused's ear print was held admissible.
R v Shaw (1830) 1 Lew CC 116, per Parke B; R v Heaton (1832) 1 Lew CC 116, per Alderson B.
See section 63 (3A) of PACE inserted by section 55 of the CJPOA 1994.
For the procedure adopted in relation to DNA evidence, see R v Doheny  1 Cr App R 369.
 Crim LR 369.
 2 Cr App R 467.
R v Tottenham Justice, ex p. ML (1986) 82 Cr App R 277, CA.
 2 Cr App R 416, CA;  1 Cr App R 475, HL.
(2004) The Times, 23 July, HL.
(Application nos 30562./04 and 30566/04), 4 December 2008 (European Court of Human Rights).
Ibid, para 47.
Ibid, para 109.
Ibid, para 87.
 AC 221.
(1923) 17 Cr App R 85. See also R v Taylor (1923) 17 Cr App R 109.
R v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 109.
 2 QB 911.
See R v Johnson  Crim LR 53. See ss.101 (1) (d) and (4) of the CJA 2003.
R v Pfenning (1995) 182 CLR 461, 539 (High Court of Australia) and R v Deenik  Crim LR 578, CA. Cf. R v Johnson , supra n.69.
R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161, CA and R v Roberts (1999) The Times, 14 September, CA.
 1 WLR 293.
R v Tupedo (1920) AD 58.
Paterson v Nixon , 1960 JC 42.
R v Montgomery  NI 120.
R v Lindsay  NZLR 1002.